The convoluted relationship between the state and citizens in conflict-ridden Syria has often been neglected in favor of more simplistic interpretations of state actions and citizens' responses, imagined and constructed through a rigid binary of dissent and consent. This paper seeks to foreground a textured analysis of the space between citizens' outright rejection of state authority and staunch loyalty to the Asad regime.
Introduction
Building on literature that foregrounds contradictory representations of nationhood 1 and the fuzzy lines of demarcation between private and public, state and society, compliance and resistance, 2 this article inquiries the layered processes of contemporary technologies of contestation in Syria, and suggests a partial explanation for their (present) failure and for a social revolution which went missing. We formulate the latter by drawing on the Foucauldian notions of "technologies of production" and "technologies of power", 3 meaning strategies that enable individuals and groups to produce and transform things and orders, and that help to shape their conduct in such a way that the ruling power is efficaciously resisted and subverted.
Scholarly discussions around the difficulties and contradictions underlying the process of contesting the state and advancing revolutionary claims remain unsatisfying. Furthermore, most media accounts focusing on state (in)capacity as well as "abused theories of failing states" 4 have progressively marginalized discussions about the muddled relationship between consent and dissent, people's attitude of "adhesion" to power, 5 as well as the sometimes-diverging ways in which societies and states are thought and practiced. 1 M. Herzfeld (2004) Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State (New York and London: Routledge). 2 A. Mbembe (2001) On the Postcolony (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press); L. Wedeen (1999) Ambiguities of Domination. Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press); L. Wedeen (2013) Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes from Syria, Critical Inquiry, 39, pp. 841-873; B. Haddad (2012) Business Networks in Syria: the Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). 3 F. Foucault, L. H. Martin et al. (1988) Technologies of the Self: a Seminar with Michel Foucault (London: Tavistock). 4 C. T. Call (2008) The Fallacy of the Failed State, Third World Quarterly, 29 (8), pp. 1491-1507. 5 P. Freire (1993) Pedagogy of the Oppressed (London: Penguin Books), p.19.
Rather than engage with the endless ways in which the Syrian state can be understood and reconceptualized in light of international scholarship, we instead investigate the controversial relationships that citizens from a variegated middle social class -who define themselves as "political opponents" and actively took part in the street protests in Syria -have sometimes continued to weave with the Syrian government in order to fulfill their personal ambitions, achievements, or, more simply, material needs. Even though here all grouped into the analytical category of "opponents", no cohesion and homogeneity is presumed behind their will and their discourse of opposing the state, nor behind an internally articulated government power structure. 6 The people who have been sampled are those who shared contradictory stories that connect their lives to the government, while using the "public transcript" 7 of revolutionary politics.
This inquiry into the everyday failures of anti-state contestation nonetheless still corroborates the argument that the state-and political authority in general-is a contingent construct, one that we can acknowledge only through its power effects. 8 This understanding of power has not, however, been well employed in the discussion of civil wars and conflicts. 9 Notwithstanding, the state will still partially be employed in this article as a self-standing entity in reflection to the common feeling and belief of the interviewees of thinking and acting outside of it.
By drawing connections between state strategies and the intimacy of everyday social life, 10 we identify in this article the terrain on which ordinary citizens continually negotiate their relationship with the state as they struggle to survive, to preserve their feeling of national belonging and sameness, of being "patriotic and rebellious at the same time". 11 We illustrate these relationships by examining the narratives provided by Syrian refugees who relocated throughout Lebanon immediately after the spring 2011 uprising and the subsequent state repression, and who still claim a relationship with the state and ordinary life in Syria. We also analyze accounts collected throughout 2013 from Syrian Kurdish political opponents inhabiting the Jazira region in northeastern Syria, while war was raging at full scale in most of the country. These accounts, we argue, demonstrate the complex way local actors have come to think about the state, its repressiveness, and the regime's survival, as a result of the uprising and the complex civil war -and regional war by proxy -that followed. 12 Even though identifying the specific reasons behind people's choices falls outside of the scope of this article, we aim to surface people's acts that undeliberately accommodated the power structure 13 and ended up being ineffective in challenging domination. This points to the consistency-divide dilemma between human consciousness and practical action. 14 While we will not argue that the Syrian revolution has simply been "armchaired" and turned into a mere illusion, we maintain that effectively fighting for a full liberation cannot be a gift bestowed by revolutionary leaders -who are often said to be missing in the Syrian process -but it 6 rather resides in "the continuing aspect of liberating action". 15 This article provides empirical evidence of the weak and scant character of the latter by focusing only on some segments of a vast and variegated political opposition.
In contrast to discourses about the strength or weakness of the Syrian state that get amplified in the media, 16 we are interested in discussing how social opposition to the regime is produced and contradicted. Such contradictions point to unsuccessful social strategies of political contestation, as they either undermine or hamper the efforts of social movements to promote and materially create change. In this sense, the Syrian case can function as a universal paradigm of technologies of contestation in crisis. These everyday contradictory practices of contestation are inherent in the ambiguity of any political process, and influence and relate to state institutions.
In this article, we operationalize the "state effects" concept 17 in the phenomenological encounter between the state and its opponents, to illustrate how the state remains both salient and elusive when we come to analyze the social processes which the state regularly governs and controls. To a certain extent, the state becomes such social processes. By drawing on this theoretical approach, the de facto ambivalence of some segments of the political opposition in the Syrian conflict is emptied of human intentions and finally tackled with radical empiricism, which suspends any ethical judgment. The epistemology that underpins (presently) failing contestation strategies reasserts the theoretical inevitability of blurring the boundary between the state and society 18 and problematizes an otherwise dichotomized political scenario. 15 P. Freire (1993) 
Everyday Life at War: The Ubiquity of "Stateness"
The state in Syria can still be viewed as a sovereign apparatus as long as it organizes and monitors health care, education, economic activities, imprisonment, and gate-keeps international aid distribution and the humanitarian agencies on the ground. 19 The surviving state authority thus derives part of its capacity from welfare provision, which, as we will illustrate, is able to produce "multiple effects on people's everyday lives ". 20 Although this article does not seek to illustrate how citizens' behaviors and perceptions affect state institutions and public policy, the line between civil society and the state does not exist, 21 nor can society and state be neatly differentiated:
discussing one side of the picture simultaneously sheds light on the other side. The state, in fact, cannot maintain absolute autonomy itself, 22 and should rather be described as an unbounded terrain of powers, techniques, discourses, rules, and practices. 23 Given these conditions, the Syrian state acquires indirect social meanings through the contradictory ways in which the Syrian people deal with such state techniques and in which the state attempts to preserve rules and practices in the face of an unprecedented decline of governance.
The accounts of Syrian opponents that we explore here shed light on the problematic contestation strategies that attempt to slip out of the way the Asad regime has managed and controlled everyday time and space for decades. 19 supplied electricity. 28 Even the so-called "Islamic State" reportedly came to terms with the Asad regime by selling oil through the regime's middleman George Haswani, who consequently became a target of European Union sanctions in March 2015. 29 As Ann Stoler has argued, state power effects go far beyond geopolitical domination or economic exploitation and inequality. 30 Such effects "lie in the details" 31 of everyday life. They leave room for the reproduction of state power in people's decisions and acts and for compliance with how the state has organized and controlled time and space, which is what ultimately counts politically. 32
In this article, we analyze "everydayness" by embracing the conception of everyday life as the unique site where the encounter between the Syrian state, the protestors, and the authors takes place, rather than a cultural object that can merely be studied. 33 Furthermore, studying everydayness in relation to "stateness"commonly meant as the ontological state of the State-is a way of understanding the impact of ideology and power on lived space, and of connecting interrelated systems that might otherwise appear to be distinct. We therefore concentrate on routines, regularities in social behaviors, and on what happens or does not happen when these "implicit rules" are broken. 34 28 B. Hubbard, C. Krauss & E. Schmitt (2014) . Rebels in Syria claim Control of Resources, The New York Times. 29 D. Blair (2015) Oil Middlemen between Syria and ISIL is New Target for EU Sanctions, The Telegraph. 30 A. L. Stoler, C. McGranahan & P. C. Perdue (eds) (2007) Imperial Formations (Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press). 31 C. Lutz (2008) Empire is in the Detail, American Ethnologist, 33 (4), pp. 593-611. 32 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination. Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria. 33 M. De Certeau (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press). 34 J. Moran (2005) Reading the Everyday (London, UK: Routledge).
The Everydayness of State Power among Lebanon-Based Syrian Refugees
The de facto survival of the Syrian state has not been the result of any deliberate moral recognition of the Asad government. As empirical evidence of this, the Syrian refugees we interviewed across Lebanon from 2011 to late 2013, who came predominantly from areas dominated by the political opposition, often suggested that the Syrian government's legitimacy was practically upheld through the diplomatic actions of foreign powers. As their accounts will emphasize, Syrian citizens themselves have echoed the survival of the state through their efforts to preserve their own life chances, professional achievements, or their desire to remain legal citizens despite their aversion to the government. In a nutshell, ordinary citizens saw no other alternative than to reconstruct everyday normalcy in a time of crisis.
In this regard, an international Syrian scholar has argued that citizens were in actually something exuding from people's banal everyday actions, although not limited to that, is certainly not new. 37 As a matter of fact, the Syrian central state has continued to survive thanks to its power effects, which keep creating meanings of their own, although they do not reflect citizens' interests. Such solipsism of state survival and self-recognition can be traced back to the behavioral politics of the Baath Party, especially to Hafez al-Asad's tacit policy of symbolic simulation of loyalty, rather than any actual feeling of love towards the state. 38 The Foucauldian politics of coercion explains this elusive and convoluted relationship between the Syrian state and Syrian citizens: people reject, but paradoxically reproduce and amplify the abuse of state authority in the structures of their everyday life. This phenomenon has been named the "intimacy of tyranny". 39 Dima, from Daraya, recounted that she is unable to quit her job in the Syrian government, …since it's the only source of income for raising my child, and, once I become jobless, I'd be hopeless and futureless. I wouldn't have any dreams to realize or objectives to achieve. If I ever decide to have no state at all, I'd cease to be a person.
Dima points here to the potential of the state as a basic guarantee of "bare life", 40 the potential to control the very biology of lives, not merely territories. 37 D. M. Nelson (2004) Individuals who express dissent are not accustomed to leading their everyday lives in a heterodox way because they grew up among state narratives that narrowly defined their possibilities of "harmonious domesticity". 41 In other words, even those who exclude themselves from the state and oppose its sovereignty and authority through civil disobedience (al-'isian al-madani) have become interrelated in a complex way with the state orthodoxy of territorial administration and political power.
A political member of the Syrian opposition from Afamia, now resettled in Lebanon, argued that "unlike my brother, I would still be allowed to enter Syria to see my family whenever I want." This statement shows him clinging to an ounce of pride for not being classified as an unwanted citizen, despite his reasserted political stance against the state. This shows how the stories people tell themselves about why they do what they do sometimes imply common feelings of passive reconciliation to one's state, making the material disaffiliation from the social and the political architecture of the state even more challenging. Citizens' persistent "desire" to think of their life as institutionalized militates against simplistic interpretations of domination by-or disaffiliation from-those in power. In some circumstances, the personal engagement in explicit displays of opposition is contradictory. Moreover, the abovementioned episode illustrates how citizens fetishize the state, which still embodies the apotheosis of rationality 42 despite the chaos and irrational violence that are continue to rage in Syria. The present hardships, largely caused by the Syrian government, which provokes sizable and diversely motivated dissent, tend to produce a longing for order and cohesion in individual experiences.
It is meaningful that the controversies entangled in people's everyday lives have often been reported by our Syrian and international interlocutors as being one of the primary causes of the revolution's failure. The inevitable contradictions of everyday life have largely been branded as treacherous-a betrayal of revolutionary ideology and something people should therefore try to conceal. In fact, the complex interrelationship between the state and the everyday life of its subjects-which keeps some Syrian opponents of the regime tethered to considerations of their basic needs and aspirations rather than to the state itself-have rarely been discussed by the type of opposition commentators on whom the international media rely for regular briefings on events in Syria. 43 For other citizens, decision-making in relation to the state was more straightforward. A., from Khaldiyye (Homs), for instance, showed an uncompromising attitude towards the issue. He refused to pay the Asad regime's troops to cancel his military conscription (a sum of 5,000 US dollars).
Are you kidding? If I really wanted to I could earn enough here in Beirut to be able to pay for that, but… no way. I won't feed the financial sources of the state army, the one that was about to kill me when I was protesting down the streets in Homs in March 2011.
For the political opponents with whom we spoke, from a "loyalist" perspective, such existing connections between citizens in the opposition and the government-through job positions, personal favors and alike-are positive proof of a general Syrian faithfulness to their state apparatus, and of a genuine desire to live within the current ruling system. From this perspective, the survival of the state is still seen as the product of a deliberate and straightforward act of identification. Such contradictory ways of contesting the state and reshaping everyday life accordingly, together with the ambiguity of international diplomacy, 44 fed the Syrian state's passion for Hobbesian self-preservation, which has survived thus far throughout the uprising and the conflict.
In sum, people's partial reluctance to reject state institutions does not translate into voluntary acknowledgment of state authority. This is something our interviewees constantly stressed. The state can still embody sovereignty independently from the population that inhabits it when the latter is kept at the margins through discriminatory administrative practices. 45 Using the interpretative lens of the interviewees, the only possible political life that either privileged or marginalized citizens can envisage resides in the framework of surviving state effects. This does not necessarily amount to pro-active political will or emotional commitment to the state.
Indeed, the interviewees motivated such contradictions with the impossibility of living an alternative life.
The historical ambivalence of the state 46 and of its own citizens 47 has doomed many Syrians to live with anguishing indecision, which was indeed observed in the field. As shown, the ambivalent relationship that many members of the Syrian opposition hold with the state has too quickly become the object of praise or reproach from other Syrian citizens and the so-called international community. This has prematurely aborted a deeper understanding about Syrian citizens who changeably dissent or support the state's practices. These citizens cannot suddenly unlearn how to be proper subjects of the state, whether in its modern conception-as an alien and abstract authority, demanding allegiance from both governors and governed 48 -and in its republican form, so to speak, as an executive entity delegated by the subjects who compose it.
We now move to examine how similar assumptions can be applied to the complex relationship between Syrian Kurdish citizens, the Syrian central state, and the emerging post-2011 state-like powers in the northeastern region, which came to fall mainly under the practical rule of the PYD.
The Syrian "Jazira" and Local Statehoods
Despite the withdrawal of Syrian troops from most Syrian Kurdish regions between 2012 and 2013, state employees in these areas continued to receive wages from Damascus. This was not only a "Kurdish exception"; several other regions, including ar-Raqqa, the future capital of the "Islamic State" caliphate maintained relations with the central authority, thus ensuring that teachers, Syrian Telecom staff, and other qualified employees remained on the government's payroll. 49 The case of Rakan, a Syrian Telecom employee in Ras al-'Ayn (al-Hasakah governorate) is exemplary. Although he was a Yekiti Party member 50 and had been actively involved in anti-government demonstrations since 2011, he continued to work for the state-owned company until 2014. He could not afford to quit his job and raise his three children, given the critical economic situation. In 2013, he was summoned by one of the Syrian intelligence branches, which had probably been informed of the fact that he was hosting a Western journalist. Rakan was torn about
whether he should answer their call and face possible detention, or ignore it and risk losing his job. In order to resolve this ethical dilemma, the Western journalist (a coauthor of the present paper) asked to be received by a high-ranking official of the PYD in al-Qamishli to request that he mediate with Syrian state authorities on the ground. The PYD official responded that there was nothing he could do, as he was himself exposed to potential arrest and had no sway on the central state apparatus.
Rakan eventually quit his job in 2014, but only after he had decided to migrate to Turkey.
This ethnographic account demonstrates the incapacity of the PYD official to protect Rakan or to provide him with an alternative job, confirming that the Asad regime's administrative sovereignty had not been completely eroded and that the state was still able to affect the ability of citizens to sustain their livelihoods and ensure their personal safety. Rakan only stopped being economically dependent on the central government-and consequently subject to its repressive agencies-when he got out of "liberated" Rojava. Since the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Kurdish regions between 2012 and 2013, the PYD has gradually sought to replace the central government as a major employer and to reduce the massive exodus that ensued after the crisis. 51 On the one hand, the Kurdish party has been successful thus far in asserting its local governance in several ways. For instance, it has gained profits from smuggling goods and people, it has been able to guarantee the distribution of basic services, and, in 2013, it was able to put the newly formed security forces (Asaiysh) and the embryonic army (known as the YPG) on its payroll, as many of our interlocutors confirmed. On the other hand, the PYD's capabilities are still far from successfully replacing the official Syrian state as a major employer in the territory in which the PYD holds de facto statehood. The Syrian government has, in fact, continued to perform as a state by providing welfare. Welfare provision has long been a key element in counter-insurgency strategies and, above all, a strategy for signaling to civilians that the state continues to exert power. 52
Another aspect of continuity in official state power is that citizens who have Education thus constitutes a further sector of everyday life in which the power of the Asad regime remains ubiquitous for Syrians, even when they are hostile to it.
As illustrated above, numerous university students stopped attending their courses due to the ongoing conflict. But in the absence of alternatives to the state education system, they found themselves compelled either to return to Baathist education or to migrate overseas when feasible. 54 Sheykhmous, a 21-year-old chemistry student, remained in ad-Darbasiyyah for a year in the hope that the situation would improve in government-controlled Latakia, where he had enrolled before the war. He eventually decided, in late 2013, to resume his studies in Latakia. Sheyhmous affirmed: "I don't want either to get stuck in 'Amuda at my family's house or migrate to Iraqi Kurdistan, which seems to me a much more conservative society where Syrians are discriminated In these accounts, the everyday ethics of justice appear highly individualized, as much as the practices of justice become arbitrary. Justice, hence, no longer represents a desirable condition of compensation and equity, but rather a constellation of subjective interpretations 57 that are constantly being contested by others who inhabit the same social space. The "jungle" of individual interests that comes to the fore during wartime reinforces the collective illusion that order can only be guaranteed by an unwavering state. The abstract idea of the state that people maintain masks the real power relations underlying what is called "public interest". 58 As a result, expressions of regret and hopelessness were easily identifiable in the field: "I swear we had a better life when the regime was in power! You didn't have to pay all this money for a kilo of tomatoes," Yade 59 Mahwosh used to proclaim every time we were about to sit for lunch in 'Amuda.
In these accounts, collected in Lebanon among Syrians and in Syrian
Kurdistan, people's acts and choiceswhich would be better explained by employing methods and goals other than the ones of the present study -are somehow produced rather than merely constrained by the state. 60 However, a group of our interlocutors, all defining themselves as political dissidents of the Asad regime despite the diversity 57 D. Poole (2004) Between Threat and Guarantee: Justice and Community in the Margins of the Peruvian State, in: Das, V. and Poole, D. (eds) Anthropology in the Margins of the State (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press), pp. 60-61. 58 Aretxaga, Maddening States, p. 400. 59 Yade means "mother" in Kurmanji, or Northern Kurdish. 60 Mitchell, The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics. of their experiences, still tended to argue that the popular resistance's purposes come from outside and not within the realm of the state. The resistance to the state has therefore grown within the state-generated moral universe and its social processes, when considered under the structural effect that the state itself emanates. Moreover, the "public transcript" 61 of the revolution back in 2011 has repeatedly tried to disguise the actual scantiness, or even absence, of everyday revolutionary acts in their intimate lives, in the intention to purport the dissent performance as a holistic way of living.
Not even the "infrapolitics" of some 62resistance that does not openly declare its intentions in times of domination -always turns into political action, let alone into revolutionary politics. The unacceptability of this analytical view on the part of the interviewees created an epistemological tension between the anti-state sentiments of our interviewees-which tended to depict the state as a self-standing entity, clearly separated from Syrian society-and the authors' perception of the citizen-state relationship.
If technologies of contestation are in crisis among Syrians, it is not because they feel a moral collective sense of being a whole ("sameness"), which can be there but in heterogeneous forms and that, to some extent, constitutes the official habitus of Syrian nationhood. Rather, the cause of the crisis is the inevitability of state architecture in everyday life, which exercises control and surveillance over social space, and the historical impossibility of opening laboratories for alternative forms of protest, which rely on historically young "repertoires of contention". 63 61 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts, p. 23. 62 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts, p. 201. 63 Leenders, "Oh Buthaina, Oh Sha'ban, the Hawrani is not Hungry-We Want Freedom!": Revolutionary Framing and Mobilization at the Onset of the Syrian Uprising, p. 246.
The feeling of sameness was reflected in the flowers that the revolutionaries used to throw at the soldiers in the street protests. 64 It was further reasserted by some Syrian anti-interventionist opponents when the specter of invasion and intervention was raised at the time of the potential US strike in the wake of the chemical attacks of August 2013. Against the backdrop of sameness, and resonating with the epistemological tension between the authors and the interviewees, opponents referred to the Asad regime as a "foreign creature", 65 and the state presence as an "occupation" (ihtilal), a comparative allusion to the Israeli occupation in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.
Technologies of Contestation in Crisis: What Alternatives to a State-Shaped

Everyday?
To illustrate how individual decisions have accidentally complicated the revolutionary process, we will utilize the theories of Syrian activist Omar Aziz, 66 usually labeled an intellectual anarchist by contemporary Syrian activists. Back in 2011, Aziz founded the first local committee in Barzeh, a district on the periphery of Damascus. Aziz's thinking identifies a lack of synergy between popular revolutionary activity and people's everyday life. By identifying the failures of the contemporary phenomenologies of protest-which cut across "Eastern" and "Western" societieshe showed how sterile and harmful it was to remain embedded within the authoritarian structures of the Syrian state while advocating and struggling for its departure. In this regard, Aziz, 67 who died in the Syrian regime's prisons in 'Adra, theorized that it was possible to identify the "time of the revolution" (zaman aththawra) and the "time of power" (zaman as-sulta).
Aziz meant for the "time of the revolution" to permeate every aspect of people's everyday life in order to be successful. The establishment of self-governing local councils-majalis mahalliya-was meant to give birth to a pragmatic alternative to the Asad apparatus. These councils arranged the autonomous distribution of food and goods, turned houses into hospitals, and made the civil resistance an actual societal reality by acting outside of state institutions. 68 Nonetheless, Aziz was aware that people would not have immediately felt confident about a hypothetical non-state (and anti-state) ruling power and provision of basic services, because it would have no historical reference in Syria. Furthermore, citizens' mistrust of one another "cancels out the possibility of any more promising form of collective action than opting for a solution that maintains the status quo". 69 Aziz envisioned a future Syrian society in which civil society and the military would coordinate. The military, at that time identified exclusively as the heterogeneous entity of the Free Syrian Army, would support civil efforts logistically and in terms of domestic security. A horizontal coordination would take place between all of the popular committees-tansiqiyyat-which cover different geographical regions and aim to mobilize the population politically. Immersing people's everyday life in temporary alternative state structures, would make it easier to boycott the official structures of statehood: by refusing to pay utility bills and organizing a general strike, for example. In the absence of an alternative structure of monitoring and protection able to guarantee service provision, citizens cannot envisage any other possibilities for asserting their social, cultural, and political persona in everyday life-and, sometimes, even their survival. Consequently, the revolution, in the first instance, should be conducted through a technology of contestation that is deployed in alternative spaces and during an alternative time in order to trigger concrete changes in the subsequent transitory stages.
In his writings, Aziz blurs the divisions between social classes in Syrian society, which have been increasingly heightened alongside confessional fractures by the Asad regime's politics of community division and alienation. 70 In this sense, Aziz differs from Engels' theory-as mentioned in Lenin's The State and Revolution 71 -in that the German theorist hypothesized that only the temporary dictatorship of the proletariat would be able to dismantle the central state as a special coercive force.
Conversely, social class is not considered in the revolutionary political project Aziz wanted to prioritize. For Aziz, the only possible transitory "free people's state" 72 is formed by local committees and councils. He never mentions what should be edified after the victory of the revolutionary process: whether the state per se should "wither away" (that is, what Engels was advocating for in his referral to the "bourgeois state") and end with the Asad dynasty; or whether, by contrast, a new liberal and democratic state can emerge from the revolutionary committees and councils. Overall, the extent to which the ultimate goal of "Azizism" was the once-for-all disappearance of the state remains uncertain, in particular if we consider statehood as a network-which 70 L. Trombetta (2013) Siria. Dagli Ottomani agli Asad. E Oltre (Milan: Edizioni Mondadori Università). 71 V. I. Lenin (1918) The State and Revolution. The Marxist Theory of the State & the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution, Collected Works, 25, In the 1970s the German Social Democrats often used to resort to this expression. the committees in the Syrian revolution could have formed more strongly-rather than a self-standing organism 73 or a mere site of struggle. 74 "revolutionary" everyday life that Aziz was theorizing and attempting to construct by departing from the first experimental committee in Barzeh. It would have offered an alternative to the everydayness produced by the state, creating the possibility of reforming the anti-state technology of protest from within.
Conclusion
Aziz's theories and, in general, the domestic theorization of alternative forms of statehood have too often gone unheeded in the interpretation of the Syrian crisis.
On the one hand, the so-called state apparatus, 78 conceived as separated from the empirical reality it produces, still serves as a discursive strategy to refer to the Asad regime's ownership of resources and infrastructures in the face of multiple forms of social discontent and impoverishment. It has reflects our interviewees' idea of thinking and acting outside of the central state. On the other-as the present article has sought to demonstrate-the state takes shape in society in a fluid and reciprocal manner; society is also a paradoxical reproduction of state strategies. In sum, society itself is the result of a mutual structural penetration.
The conflicted relationships between dissident citizens and the central state, as much as the supposedly simple binary between popular dissent and consent, requires a phenomenological epistemology. Indeed, there can be no clear-cut distinction between what inherently constitutes the state and what gives rise to an imaginary freestanding "civil society," as both can only be observed as a network of practices and relationships 79 through which the socio-political order struggles to be maintained. 78 Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. Notes towards an Investigation. 79 This raises the importance of recognizing the complex articulation between how we think about state and society and how we can actually observe them in their empirical processes and practices. This paper has argued against analyses based on the notion of self-standing statehood, which fails to adequately capture the reality of statehood as practiced in everyday life. Instead, it has tried to foreground how the state is incorporated into the thinking and actions of individual citizens. 80 In this framework, our ethnographic insights have exposed the way the state empirically manifests itself in daily life.
Statehood-and not only "stateness," that is, the ontological condition of the State-is itself a phenomenological process, not an entity. As such, it can still be spoken of as a network, a complex terrain where controversial processes, desires, practices, and policies intertwine.
Even though it is not ontologically possible to delineate where the state begins and society ends, opposing processes and intentions can be identified in such networks. In this regard, this paper has addressed how the actions of individual citizens have practically complied with the state strategies, despite the citizens' explicit desire to oppose the state. Several material factors explain how this microreproduction of state power in people's lives is still in effect in Syria: the central state's continued ownership of the ports and other points of access to Lebanon; the state's capacity to provide an acceptable level of service to a relatively populated area of Syria; the state's ability to pay civil servants; the state's interest in keeping national schools and universities open in areas ruled by the Asad regime (these institutions are therefore not targeted by government shelling).
The emergence of multiple statehoods-negotiating, overlapping with, and fighting each other-which the PYD political experience is revealing in northerneastern Syria-can therefore be described as a complex political phenomenon. The citizens, whether defined as hardliners or willing to compromise, are not simply restricted by political totalitarianism. Instead, they reproduce and respond to the forms of power they experience on an everyday basis. We have tried to explain the undesired reproduction of state strategies and desires in the intimate forms of everyday life 81 in light of an empirical lack of viable, alternative forms of everydayness. This had led to the temporary failure of political opponents to boycott the forms of everydayness that have been produced by the central state. By this token, our interviewees' intimate and public transcripts of politics represent the exact opposite of the "quiet encroachment of the subaltern". 82
In conclusion, the emerging statehood of the PYD, the central state, and popular resistance can only be described as hybrid terrains of mutually conditioned practices. The Syrian state and its rival (or occasionally allied) statehoods have been reconsidered here as political processes rather than separate entities. Citizens, too, we have viewed as a product of the contradictory relations that they weave with the surviving or emerging statehoods on the ground. Popular resistance is also formed within state-related networks. 83 While the international focus on state failure or state survival has failed to unearth, explain, and value the actual actions of citizens, new avenues for practicing everyday dissent still need to be suggested in Syria and worldwide. The current 81 Mbembe, On the Postcolony. 82 Bayat, From 'Dangerous Classes' to 'Quiet Rebels'. Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South. 83 Mitchell, The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics; Mitchell, Society, Economy and the State Effect. political process in Syria becomes an international paradigm for contestation in crisis, which can be faced and challenged only if the state and practices of resistance are thought and approached as relational political processes.
